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The Sheriff in Our Minds: On the Morality of the Mental 
Many people believe that our thoughts can be morally wrong. Many regard rape and murder 
fantasies as wrong. In a recent essay, George Sher disagrees with this and argues that “the realm 
of the purely mental is best regarded as a morality-free zone,” wherein “no thoughts or attitudes 
are either forbidden or required” (484). Sher argues that “each person’s subjectivity is a limitless, 
lawless wild west in which absolutely everything is permitted” (484). Sher calls this view the 
Wild West of the Mind. 
I argue against Sher’s position. In section I, I summarize Sher’s view. In section II, I 
outline and criticize Sher’s argument for the Wild West of the Mind. Sher identifies two features 
of the mental realm that he thinks put our thoughts beyond the scope of morality. The first 
feature of the mental that Sher appeals to is that rules against actions have discrete boundaries, 
while rules against thoughts do not. I argue that this problem is equally true of actions and 
thoughts, meaning that this argument fails to show how thoughts are morally different from 
actions. The second feature of the mental that Sher points to is that our mental lives are 
impermeable to and disconnected from other people, meaning that they cannot wrong others. I 
argue that our thoughts, despite being impermeable and disconnected, can wrong others by 
inflicting unfelt harms upon them. 
In section III, I outline additional objections to Sher’s view. First, I argue that Sher’s 
view should actually be understood as being about the permissibly of any unheard utterance, not 
just about the permissibility of private thoughts. This clarification, I argue, renders his view 
implausible. Second, I argue that our thoughts can inflict unfelt harms on others, making them 




I: Sher’s argument: 
Sher’s thesis is the following: 
Wild West of the Mind (WWM): for any purely private thought, T, that is expressed in 
an agent’s, S’s, mind, T is not morally wrong. 
 
Sher offers several clarifications of WWM. First, he is not denying that one’s thoughts “can 
reflect badly on his character” (484). He agrees that some thoughts suggest that an individual is 
vicious. Second, he agrees that one’s thoughts can be epistemically wrong (i.e. epistemically 
unjustified). With these clarifications, Sher’s claim is that “where a person’s private mental 
contents are concerned,” condemnation based on viciousness or epistemic wrongness “are the 
only forms of condemnation that are in place” (484). As Sher later argues, these forms of 
condemnation are not sufficient to support the view that our private thoughts can be wrong. 
Lastly, Sher is not addressing cases where an individual’s actions are made better or 
worse in virtue of her thoughts. For example, imagine a case in which Smith pushes Jones to hurt 
him and another case where Smith pushes Jones to save him from being hit by a train. Smith’s 
thoughts are clearly morally relevant. It would be implausible to deny that Smith’s intentions 
make a moral difference in how we should evaluate his actions. To avoid this implication, Sher 
distinguishes between purely private thoughts and thoughts that have both a public and a private 
component. The former exist only in the mind and have no physical expression in the world, 
while the latter include both thought and action. In the cases of Smith and Jones, we are dealing 
with “composite occurrences that have both public and private components” (485). Sher’s claim 
is only that our purely private thoughts cannot be wrong.  
II. Problems With Sher’s Argument: 
Sher defends WWM by arguing that all available arguments against WWM are bad and also by 
outlining positive reasons for WWM. I will not address Sher’s negative argument. Instead, I 
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object to his positive argument for WWM. In his positive argument, Sher identifies two features 
of the mental that seem to put our thoughts beyond the scope of morality. 
The first feature of the mental that Sher appeals to is that rules against actions have 
discrete boundaries, while rules against thoughts do not. As Sher says, “when morality or the law 
forbids me to shoot you, the act that it forbids begins with my decision to pull the trigger and 
ends with the bullet penetrating your body” (492). However, when it comes to thoughts, “if 
morality were to forbid me to think of shooting you, the prohibition would inevitably diffuse 
itself, like dye poured into water, among innumerable other thoughts and feelings” (492). In 
short, to avoid thinking about shooting someone, one needs to refrain from a host of other 
thoughts about that person. Sher continues: normal people “can easily resist the transition from 
the impulse to shoot you to the deed itself,” but most normal people “have far less control 
over...[their] inferences and associations; so, to guard against thinking about shooting you, I 
would also have to avoid many other thoughts” (492).  If it’s wrong for me to fantasize about 
shooting someone, I would “have to avoid dwelling on the wrong that [they] have done to me,” 
because that thought may lead me to think about shooting them (492-493). More generally, “to 
know which thoughts to avoid, I would have to know which ones might lead to the forbidden 
thought” and avoid them too (493). So, actions can be morally evaluated, because they have 
discrete boundaries; but, if we were to morally evaluate our thoughts, we must also evaluate all 
the thoughts that lead to our purportedly bad thoughts. This seems implausible. 
Sher’s criticisms apply equally to actions. To say that it’s wrong for Smith to kill Jones 
also means that it’s wrong for Smith to do things outside of killing Jones but which will lead to 
killing Jones. For example, buying a gun, researching how to dispose a body, etc. are all wrong. 
4 
 
So, it seems that actions are just as permeable as thoughts. Since this is not problematic for 
actions, it should not be problematic for thoughts. 
Sher might respond: if Smith buying a gun won’t lead to him killing Jones, then buying 
the gun is not wrong. Only those actions that most likely would lead to the killing are wrong, not 
the ones leading up to it, because they don’t cause the killing.1  
I agree that if buying the gun has no causal connection to Smith killing Jones, then it is 
not wrong for Smith to buy the gun. But, given Sher’s reasoning for the permeability of thoughts, 
I believe that the problem applies equally to actions. Recall that Sher’s reasoning for why the 
wrongness of thoughts can spread so easily while the wrongness of actions cannot: normal 
people “can easily resist the transition from the impulse to shoot you to the deed itself,” but most 
normal people “have far less control over...[their] inferences and associations; so, to guard 
against thinking about shooting you, I would also have to avoid many other thoughts” (492).  
Sher’s argument seems to rely on the claim that the jump from thought X to murderous thought 
Y is not within our voluntary control, while the jump from action X to murderous action Y is 
within our control. This explains how blame for thoughts can permeate very far. Wouldn’t this 
same principle be able to apply to some actions? Suppose that Smith knows that if he were to 
buy a gun, this would vastly increase the likelihood that he would kill Jones. Wouldn’t it be 
wrong for him to buy the gun? Also, it’s otherwise permissible for Smith drive down Jones’ 
Street. But, if he does so knowing that this will fill him with uncontrollable rage, leading to him 
killing Jones, then this is wrong. Using Sher’s reasoning, we can show that some actions are 
equally permeable to thoughts in terms of blame.  
 
1 I am thankful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
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One might say that, in general, we have more control over the shift from thought to action 
than we do over the shift from thought to thought. While that may be true, the important 
takeaway is that this is not a unique problem for thoughts. For those links between thoughts that 
are voluntary, we can avoid the problem posed by Sher.2 
Lastly, the proponent of my position can bite the bullet say that if we regard thought X as 
wrong, we should regard all thoughts that knowingly lead to X as being somewhat wrong. Like I 
said above, this seems like the right answer for otherwise permissible actions that knowingly 
lead to a bad action.  
The second feature of the mental that Sher points to is the fact that our mental lives are 
impermeable to and disconnected from other people. Sher argues that the mental and the public  
are different, in that “what is going on in each person’s subjectivity is always independent of, 
and is often wildly at variance with, what is concurrently going on in his public neighborhood” 
(494). Given the “impermeability and independence of each person’s subjectivity,” Sher argues 
that “each subjectivity is almost literally a world of its own” (494). Sher claims that, in light of 
this gulf between our minds, our thoughts about other people are representations of those people 
which don’t have moral standing. As he says, “the ‘people’ who populate our mental landscapes 
are only shadow people, and you can’t have a moral obligation...to a shadow” (494). 
 
2 One might object that the jump from one action to the other has more barriers in place than the jump from one 
thought to the other. For example, as a referee pointed out to me, Smith (in the previous example) may have a lock 
on his door, he may see a police officer as he drives, etc. All of these are physical objects will likely deter Smith 
moving from action X to action Y (murder). It seems less clear that there are similar barriers for thoughts. This 
suggests that there is more control (and thus more responsibility) when Smith moves from action to action than 
when he goes from thought to thought. I’m not convinced that this is always the case. There are many thoughts that 
can, so to speak, unlock doors in our minds. Suppose that Smith is a loving spouse who cares very much about 
fidelity. Smith never fantasizes about his attractive coworker, because he knows that if he were to start doing so, this 
would unlock a door in his mind to fantasizing about many other women in his life. In the same way that the lock on 
the door deters Smith from leaving the house, the concern for fidelity deters Smith from fantasizing. I would guess 
that the concern for fidelity is a more effective deterrent than a locked door. However, even if the reviewer is correct 
that this difference makes thoughts more permeable than actions, I think it would only show a difference in degree, 
not in kind. In principle, we can be responsible for thoughts which likely lead to other thoughts and actions which 
likely lead to other actions. But, it may be the case that this principle applies fewer times to thoughts than to actions.  
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This is questionable. In the next section, I argue that one’s private thoughts can be 
intrinsically wrong and that they can affect the well-being of others, regardless of whether those 
thoughts are about shadow people.  
III: Reasons Against WWM: 
Here, I develop several objections to WWM that Sher does not consider. 
i. What’s Special About Our Minds? 
Consider the following cases: 
Hate in the Head: Smith, who hates Jews, privately thinks that the Holocaust was 
morally justified.  
 
Hate in an Empty Room: Smith, who hates Jews, is in an empty room, on top of an 
empty mountain, etc., and publically states his belief that the Holocaust was morally 
justified. 
 
The only difference between the cases is whether the hateful sentence is uttered out loud or 
merely in Smith’s head. We can stipulate that, in both cases, nobody will find out about it, it 
won’t make Smith more likely to do something bad, etc. Sher’s view initially seems to suggest 
that there is a moral difference between these cases. That seems implausible. 
Sher might respond that, in Hate in an Empty Room, Smith’s words have the capacity to 
cause harm, while in Hate in the Head, Smith’s thoughts lack such a capacity. But, this is not the 
case. I’ve stipulated that nobody will hear Smith. We can imagine a version of Hate in the Head 
in which someone reads Smith’s mind and is harmed by his thoughts. Thus, the capacity to harm 
is not a genuine difference between these cases.3  
These cases suggest that the mental realm does no work in Sher’s account. If the mental 
qua mental were doing any work, then we should regard the above cases as morally different. 
 
3 One might wonder whether Sher’s view entails that certain thoughts become impermissible only when someone is 
in an MRI machine and the contents of their thoughts can be discerned. This would be a strange implication. 
7 
 
But, there seems to be no reason for doing so. Thus, on Sher’s view, the mental does no intrinsic 
work.  
Contrast these theses: 
WWM: for any purely private thought, T, that is expressed an agent’s, S’s, mind, T is not 
morally wrong. 
 
Permissibility of Unheard Utterances (PUU): for any utterance, U, it is not wrong for S 
to utter U, in her mind or in speech, so long as nobody is ever aware that S uttered U. 
 
Sher intends to endorse WWM. But, if he cannot offer a principled reason for regarding Smith’s 
action as permissible in Hate in the Head but wrong in Hate in an Empty Room, then he is really 
committed to PUU. In other words, when we press Sher’s account, it seems that he cannot hold 
that our thoughts are not wrong because they are in our mind but rather must hold that our 
thoughts are not wrong because others don’t know what we are thinking about. If so, Sher must 
revise his position to say that our utterances and feelings, mental or otherwise, are only wrong if 
they are made known to others. 
This has two important implications. First, Sher’s position, contrary to his opinion, is not 
about the mental at all. Second, as I will argue in the coming paragraphs, PUU is false. If Sher is 
committed to PUU, then his view is false. 
Again, PUU says that our utterances, mental or verbal, are not wrong if others don’t find out 
about them. We can see the implausibility of this thesis by considering the following cases: 
Joke in an Empty Room: Smith, who is anti-Semitic, says a horribly offensive 
Holocaust joke in an empty room. 
 
Causal Impotence Hitler Vote: voting is a kind of utterance. Smith lives in Germany in 
1933. Smith knows that Hitler will win the election and thus knows that he is causally 
impotent over the outcome. And, Smith knows that nobody will ever find out about his 




In both cases, we can stipulate that nobody will be directly harmed by Smith’s action, and 
nobody will find out about Smith’s actions. However, it seems intuitively clear that there is 
something morally wrong about both of these actions. The precise explanation of why these 
actions seem wrong, I contend, is that they involve an agent either endorsing an evil action or 
expressing and endorsing an evil belief. In Joke in an Empty Room, Smith expresses and 
endorses a morally repugnant belief, and in Causal Impotence Hitler Vote, Smith endorses an 
evil agent and his policies. This judgment can be summed up in the following thesis: 
Endorsement: it is prima facie wrong to endorse morally wrong ideas or agents.4 
 
The Endorsement principle seems like the best explanation of my intuitions in the 
aforementioned cases. Additionally, A further intuitive defense can be offered in favor of 
Endorsement. Consider these cases: 
Smith: Smith is a typical person with typical beliefs, none of which are all that 
objectionable. He is generally nice to people in his life. 
 
Nazi Jones: Jones is identical in all  respects to Smith, but he also harbors horribly anti-
Semitic beliefs. Although he never acts on these beliefs, Jones essentially subscribes to 
the Nazi political ideology.  
 
By stipulation, both Smith and Jones will be generally nice people for most of their lives. So, the 
only difference between them is that Jones is a closeted Nazi. Intuitively, it seems clear to me 
 
4 Corvino (2002) endorses a similar view. The argument for Endorsement is that it explains what I believe are clear 
intuitions in Joke in an Empty Room and Causal Impotence Hitler Vote; the defense of Endorsement does not rely 
on any reference to Unfelt Harms. The Endorsement Principle helps to clarify something seemingly paradoxical in 
my view. If it’s wrong to have a certain thought, then isn’t it wrong to hold the thought in one’s head long enough to 
judge that it’s wrong? According to the Endorsement Principle, what is wrong is not the mere having of a thought in 
one’s head but rather then endorsement of its content. For example, if one were to write a paper about the wrong of 




that Jones is a morally worse person than Smith.5 And, the only explanation for this is that Jones 
endorses morally wrong ideas. 
If this account is true, and if our intuitions in the above cases are correct, then not all 
unheard utterances are permissible. Thus, PUU is false. And, given that WWM reduces to PUU, 
WWM is false.6 
One might object that the Endorsement Principle seems to rely on the claim that our 
beliefs are within our control, which sounds false. Thus, the Endorsement Principle never gets 
off the ground. I have several responses to this objection.7  
First, although it is less commonly endorsed, one could be a doxastic voluntarist of a 
certain variety. As I see it, doxastic voluntarism is the view that agents exercise at least some 
control (either direct or indirect) over some of their beliefs. I think that it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to enter into the debate about the voluntariness of belief. But, what I can say here is 
that if it turns out that my view requires doxastic voluntarism to be true, this would be a less 
common, but still defensible position.8  
Second, it seems clear to me that there is something prima facie wrong about endorsing 
morally wrong ideas or agents. Suppose that Smith had complete control over his political 
beliefs, and he chose to be a Nazi. This would be wrong. Of course, nobody has direct control 
over their beliefs. But, what this example shows is that there can be something prima facie wrong 
 
5 Sher’s view is not about one’s character, so I don’t mean this example to be mainly about character. Instead, I 
mean that the fact that Nazi Jones has a worse character than Smith is best explained by the wrongness of Jones’ 
mental actions. So, the point here concerns a conduct-based evaluation, not a primarily character-based one. 
6 Sher might respond that there is still a difference between Hate in the Head and Hate in an Empty Room, namely 
that verbal utterances have clear boundaries, while thoughts do not. Perhaps the precursors to a private thought are 
much more difficult to map out, while the precursors to a public utterance are clear. To this, I again reply that I think 
thoughts and actions are just as porous. Just as I cannot perfectly map out all of the chemical reactions that lead to 
my thoughts, nor can I do so for actions. Also, actions stem from our mental life, meaning that the permeability of 
thoughts would have to apply to actions as well. 
7 Thank you to an anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention.  
8 For classic arguments, see Steup (2000) and Alston (1989) 
10 
 
about some endorsements. Now, modify the case to real life and add that Smith became a Nazi 
believer as a result of causes that he could not control. It seems like the wrongness of Smith’s 
belief might be defeated by the fact that he could not control his beliefs. But, the important 
insight is that there is wrongness there to be defeated, meaning that endorsements can be prima 
facie wrong.  
Why does this matter? This would show that many of our thoughts that involve bad 
endorsements are prima facie wrong but that the wrongness is defeated. This would still run 
contrary to Sher’s position. As I read Sher, he wants to argue that there is no moral valence at all 
with our thoughts. As he says, the mental is “morality-free” (483). Beyond this, my position 
would also be able to maintain that any endorsements we make which are, in some way, within 
our voluntary control can be morally evaluated. I agree that many beliefs seem to not be under 
our direct control. But, many beliefs also seem to be under our indirect control. We can choose to 
look at (or ignore) evidence against our position, we can choose to seek out people who disagree 
(or choose not to), etc. These are all ways that we exercise some indirect control over what we 
believe. To the extent that Smith’s Nazi beliefs and endorsements are the result of his indirect 
control, then he can be blamed for his endorsement of those beliefs.  
ii. Unfelt Harms: 
Here, I argue, based on the possibility of unfelt harms, that Sher’s view is false. Consider two 
cases: 
Chris: Chris lives a normal life, and all of his friends often think positively about him. 
Chris never finds about his friends’ thoughts. 
 
Alastair: Alastair lives a similar life to Chris. But, all his friends are constantly 
fantasizing about grotesque ways of killing him, stealing his money, etc. They won’t ever 
do these things, but they still fantasize about them. They never speak to each other about 
these fantasies, and Alastair never finds out about any of this. Alastair desires that his 




Intuitively, it seems that Alastair’s life is going worse for him than Chris’s. It doesn’t seem to 
matter that neither of them will find out about their friends’ thoughts. Even with that stipulation 
in place, it seems obvious that Chris’s life is going better than Alastair’s.  
The intuition that Alastair’s life is going worse than Chris’s can be explained by the 
concept of unfelt harm. Many philosophers have defended the view that individuals can be 
harmed by actions that never affect their subjective experience.9 Boonin advances a sustained 
argument for the possibility of unfelt harms. Although I lack space to outline Boonin’s full 
argument, it is motivated by cases like this: 
Adultery: “Bob wants his marriage to Carol to be monogamous and he believes that it is, 
but in fact Carol cheats on him regularly” (17). 
 
Most people have the intuition that Bob is being harmed by Carol’s adultery, even if he never 
finds out about it. Or, as Boonin puts it, “if Carol’s acts really are harming Bob despite the fact 
that her acts are having no effect on Bob’s mental states…then Carol is inflicting unfelt harm on 
Bob” (20). I lack sufficient space to launch a full-scale defense of the unfelt harm position, but I 
take it to be prima facie intuitive that, in cases like Adultery, unfelt harm is occurring. At the 
very least, the objector to this position must say that Bob is not being harmed at all and that our 
intuitions are being misled by something. This would be a prima facie counter-intuitive 
position.10 
 
9 Feinberg (1984), Parfit (1984), Pitcher (1984), and Boonin (2019) have defended the possibility of posthumous 
harm. 
10 One might wonder how the adultery case, which involves an action inflicting an unfelt harm, can be used to 
support the claim that a thought can inflict unfelt harm. The point of the adultery case is to illustrate that something 
which an agent does not know can still harm him. If I am correct that mental and verbal utterances are morally on a 
par, and if verbal utterances are actions, then it would follow that both external utterances and thoughts should be 
considered in the same category as physical acts. And, if physical acts can inflict unfelt harm, then external verbal 
speech acts and thoughts should be treated in the same way. Put more simply, as long as we agree that something an 
agent doesn’t know about can harm him, I don’t see a reason to think that unfelt actions inflict harm while unfelt 
thoughts or utterances cannot. 
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If unfelt harms are possible, then Alastair is being harmed by his friends’ thoughts. If 
Alastair can be harmed without knowing it, and as long as we agree that the frustration of our 
desires can be harmful to us,11 then it follows that Alastair is being harmed by his friends’ 
thoughts. Alastair desires that his friends not engage in fantasies about killing him. Thus, when 
his friends engage in these fantasies, they frustrate his desires and harm him. Since well-being 
and harm are moral concepts, it follows that our private thoughts can be wrong in virtue of 
causing someone to have less well-being and to be in a harmed state. 
One might immediately worry that even if we agree that unfelt harms are genuine harms, 
it needs to be argued that they can constitute wrongs. This is especially important, given that 
many of our thoughts are not within our control even if they are harmful.12 My argument that the 
mental is morally laden is not meant to include involuntary thoughts. For example, intrusive 
thoughts, sudden thoughts, images popping into one’s head, etc. would count as involuntary. On 
my view, these thoughts may be harmful in some sense, but the harm does not rise to the level of 
a wrong because the agent has an excuse, namely that the thought was not within her control. 
This is especially important for people with certain mental disorders, such as OCD, where the 
agent feels excessive responsibility and guilt over her thoughts. For such individuals, the 
realization that the majority of their thoughts are not within their control is freeing. I am only 
concerned with voluntary thoughts. Although many thoughts are not voluntary, the relevant ones 
are. I want to discuss thought categories like indulged fantasies, prolonged voluntary 
daydreaming, etc. Any time an agent gets a thought and chooses to indulge it and follow it is a 
voluntary thought.  
 
11 I am not claiming that desire frustration is always bad for us. My argument does not rely on such a strong claim. 
But, everyone agrees that the frustration of some clearly reasonable desires harms us. And, Alastair’s desire for his 
friends to think well of him is a reasonable desire. 
12 Sher’s argument does not rely on the claim that our thoughts are not within our control. 
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With that clarification, we can now assess the move from unfelt harm to unfelt wrong in 
the world of thoughts. The basic argument can be made in two ways. First, if we agree that 
unfelt harm is a genuine harm, and if we agree that harms of any kind are prima facie wrong, 
then we should agree than unfelt harms are prima facie wrong. The burden of proof shifts to the 
objector to say why unfelt harms are genuine harms but cannot move into the realm of being 
wrongs. Second, there are clear examples of unfelt wrongs. For example, suppose that my 
neighbor watches me shower every day through the window from his house. Given that he is on 
his property, he has not trespassed onto my land. He has done nothing that affects my subjective 
experience. Thus, the best explanation of why this peeping Tom is acting wrongly is some kind 
of unfelt harm. The burden would then be on the objector to explain this case as wrongful 
without reference to unfelt harm. One might object that in the previous case, the wrong can be 
explained by a privacy rights violation instead of unfelt harm. Still, it seems clear to me that the 
act is not just violating my rights; it also harms me. And, we can devise a case of an unfelt wrong 
that doesn’t have this feature. For example, in the previous case of Alastair, it seems wrong for 
his friends to be constantly gossiping about him, but he has no right against this. Thus, unfelt 
harms leading to an unfelt wrong best explain the wrongness of their gossip.13 
 
13 One might object that my examples jump between being examples of unfelt harms and unfelt rights violations. 
But, I’ve tried to lump those into one category and infer from unfelt rights violations to unfelt wrongs. However, it 
may be the case that unfelt rights violations are harmful and thus wrong, while unfelt harms (which don’t violate 
anyone’s rights) do not count as genuine harms. I have several responses to this objection. First, whether it is an 
unfelt rights violation or an unfelt harm, it still seems clear that, from the third person perspective, Alastair’s life is 
going worse than Chris’s. Perhaps unfelt rights impose a more substantial wrong on an agent. But, from the external 
point of view, the unfelt harm directed at Alastair (even if he has no right against it) makes his life go worse. To put 
it differently, his life would be going better for him if his friends were not gossiping about him. Both Boonin and 
Pitcher make a similar move in their defenses of unfelt harms.  Second, it seems arbitrary to me to say that unfelt 
harms do not genuinely wronng an agent while unfelt rights violations do. I agree that unfelt rights violations might 
be worse, but they are not different in any relevant ways. Both unfelt harms and unfelt rights violations are unknown 
to the agent, don’t affect her subjective experience, etc. It seems strange to say that one is morally relevant while the 
other is not.  
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Sher might respond by saying that the subject of the harm is not really Alastair; instead, 
shadow-Alastair is affected by the gossip. And, harms against shadow-Alastair don’t matter. 
Suppose that an author needlessly kills her main character. This may be unnecessary, but it 
would be odd to say that it’s wrong, because the character is not real. Shadow-Alastair is no 
different from this fictional character. Thus, we should not be concerned with harms done to 
shadow-Alastair. In a sense, this objection would allow Sher to agree with the possibility of 
unfelt harms while still responding to my objection, because he would be saying that the unfelt 
harm is taking place but is directed at a shadow person, whose interests are not morally relevant. 
While I see the motivation for this view, I’m skeptical of the ontological commitment involved 
in positing shadow people. Where do they exist? Do they come into existence whenever I 
conceive of them? Or, do we have a certain number of pre-existing shadow selves that exist? 
But, suppose that Sher had a good response to these worries, I still believe that the unfelt harms 
objection succeeds. If we were to ask Alastair’s friends who they are directing their comments 
to, they would say that they mean them in reference to the real Alastair, not to shadow-Alastair. 
If Sher is to claim that the gossipers’ comments are actually addressed at shadow-Alastair, then 
he is committed to a highly revisionary view about how these speakers use language. In other 
words, for Sher’s view to succeed, the gossipers would have to be mistaken about who they are 
referring to as the object of the gossip. My view maintains that they are referring to exactly the 
person who they claim to be referring to. 
iv. Action-Thought Composites: 
Sher is keen to point out that his view is only about purely private thoughts, not about thought-
act composites. A purely private thought is one that never leads to a corresponding action, while 
a thought-act composite is a thought that does lead to an action. Recall the cases of Smith and 
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Jones. In one case, Smith pushes Jones with the intention of saving his life, and in the other case, 
Smith pushes Jones in front of a train with the intention of killing him. Smith’s thoughts clearly 
make a moral difference. One might be inclined to look at the cases of Smith and Jones and say 
that this is evidence that our thoughts have a moral valence. After all, the difference between an 
attempted murder and an attempted lifesaving is Smith’s intentions.  This might lead one to say 
that Smith’s murderous thoughts are wrong, even if they are never put into practice. Sher denies 
this; as he says, “to warrant condemnation for maliciously injuring someone, a person must not 
only harbor the malice but actually inflict the injury. Thus, taken by itself, the claim that it is 
wrong to give public expression to private malice does not imply that there is anything wrong 
with simply entertaining the malice” (3). 
This is counter-intuitive. Sher is saying that a malicious thought is not wrong on its own. 
But, the conjunction of a malicious thought and a malicious action is wrong. However, Sher 
presumably wants to say that the conjunction of a malicious thought and a malicious action is 
worse than just a malicious action. If Smith and Jones (who is Jewish) are boxing, and Smith hits 
Jones because he wants to win and because he hates Jewish people, this is clearly worse than 
Wilson (who is not anti-Semitic) hitting Jones during a boxing match only because he wants to 
win. So, Sher seems to be committed to the following position: the conjunction of a malicious 
thought and a malicious action is worse than just a malicious action, but the malicious thought is 
not wrong on its own. This is puzzling; if the malicious thought is not wrong on its own, then 
how does it add any wrongness to the malicious action? Sher seems to claim that a malicious 
thought, which is not independently wrong, somehow contributes to the wrongness of malicious 
thought-action composites.14 This view violates the following principle about wrongness: 
 
14 One might object that there is no such thing as a malicious action without a malicious thought. While I agree in a 
sense that some actions depend constitutively for their wrongness on the motive behind them, there are certainly still 
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No New Wrongness: if an action, X, is not wrong, it cannot make some further action, 
Y, (to which it is conjuncted) more wrong than Y already was. 
 
This principle seems hard to deny. Yet, Sher is committed to denying it, which puts him in a 
counter-intuitive position. Either he must admit that his view extends to both purely private 
thoughts and thought-act composites (which he does not want to do), or he must offer an account 
of the seemingly magical emergent wrongness of malicious thoughts that comes into being when 
they are added to malicious actions.15 
 Sher could object that No New Wrongness is false on the grounds that an organic unity is 
formed whenever a malicious thought and action are combined. In other words, even if there is 
nothing wrong about malicious thoughts, there might be something wrong in the state of affairs 
that combines malicious thoughts and actions, and this wrongness could be more than the 
wrongness of the malicious action on its own. While this would be a possible response, it doesn’t 
seem more plausible than my view. What is gained by saying that an organic unity is formed 
when a malicious thought and intention are added together instead of saying that the thought is 
independently wrong? While I’m not skeptical of organic unities, it seems too convenient to 
posit them here. At the very least, they should be avoided when possible, and I have provided a 
way to avoid an organic unity here. 
 One might object that this argument misunderstands the connection between 
wrongfulness and the agent’s mental states at the time of action. It could be that the person who 
 
bad actions that have no thoughts attached to them. Killing someone without malice is still wrong. So, it seems 
perfectly reasonable to claim that there can be wrong actions independent of the thoughts that connect with them. 
But, the criticism above would not apply to actions like lying, because whether something is a lie or not depends on 
the intentions of the speaker. But, not all actions, or even most, are this way. 
15 Consider the following potential counter-example: Smith swings a bat. This is not wrong. Now, Smith swings the 
bat at the same speed and intentionally hits a child. Here, an action that was not wrong is added to another action 
and increases the wrongness of that action. This is not a genuine counter-example. The two actions are X (swinging 
a bat) and Y (hitting a child). The wrongness of Y is not increased by X. Hitting a child is what makes Y wrong, not 
the method by which the hitting occurs. 
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unknowingly pushes Jones to his death is acting wrongly but is not blameworthy, due to 
ignorance, etc. Perhaps the agent’s mental states are relevant to judgments of culpability but not 
relevant to judgments of wrongness. Thus, my argument in this section may rest on a false 
presupposition about how mental states and actions interact in terms of moral evaluation. 
Although it is controversial, I am sympathetic to subjectivism about moral obligations, 
which I understand to be the view that actions are right or wrong depending on what the agent 
believes at the time of action. If this view is true, then attributions of culpability and wrongness 
go hand in hand. On other days of the week, I’m sympathetic to the ambiguity view, which I 
understand to be the view that “right” and “ought” can have both objective and subjective senses. 
So, on this view, there is some sense of rightness that goes with culpability and some sense that 
tracks the objective facts of the situation. All of this is to say that I think there is good reason to 
connect wrongfulness and culpability.16  
But, I realize that the preceding is controversial. Given this, I think my view can succeed 
even if wrongness and culpability are completely separate. If this were the case, I could re-word 
the No New Wrongness Principle to be about culpability instead. It would then read: if an action, 
X, is not blameworthy, it cannot make some further action, Y (to which it is conjuncted) more 
blameworthy than Y already was. I think the same problem for Sher’s view could be generated at 
the level of blameworthiness for thoughts, even if wrongness ends up not being the correct label. 
Sher would then need to explain how a thought which was not blameworthy suddenly becomes 
blameworthy when it is added to a wrong action. 
IV. Conclusion: 
 
16 For a helpful discussion of this debate, see Mason (2013), Graham (2010), and Zimmerman (2006). 
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Sher’s argument for WWM fails. Contrary to Sher’s view, the mind is not a wild west. There is a 
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